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Technical Review Panel for the PIMS Model: Final Report
Abstract
In April of 2013, the Pension Research Council of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania
convened a Technical Review Panel, comprising ten experts whose task it was to review the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation’s (PBGC) Pension Insurance Modeling System (PIMS), including inputs, outputs, and
model assumptions. The review was intended to provide a formal evaluation of the technical adequacy of the
model by outside experts. Each expert participating on the Technical Panel was asked to review background
material (see References) and focus on a particular aspect of the PIMS model. The list of panelists and topics
was developed by the Council in discussion with the Social Security Administration (SSA). This report and
the appended papers herein from our Technical Panel comprise the Final Report under this project. The
Panel’s key findings may be summarized as follows: 1. The PIMS models are an important and valuable tool in
modeling the Agency’s liability risk. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other model that can do a
comparable job. 2. Nevertheless, some improvements could be integrated in the Agency’s approach to
modeling. Those deserving highest priority attention in the experts’ view are the following: a) Incorporating
systematic mortality risk (i.e., treat mortality and longevity as stochastic variables); b) Including new asset
classes increasingly found in defined benefit plan portfolios (e.g. commercial real estate, private equity funds,
infrastructure, hedge funds, and others); c) Developing a more complex model for the term structure of
interest rates; and d) Incorporating an option value approach to pricing the insurance provided. 3. The Agency
could also do more to communicate the range of uncertainty and potential for problems associated with the
PBGC’s financial status. This could include additional information including the Conditional Value at Risk
(CVaR), and perhaps an ‘intermediate,’ ‘optimistic’, and ‘pessimistic’ set of projected outcomes, as well as the
expected ‘date of exhaustion’ for assets backing pension benefits insured by the PBGC.
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Abstract 
 
In April of 2013, the Pension Research Council of the Wharton School at the University of 
Pennsylvania convened a Technical Review Panel, comprising ten experts whose task it was to 
review the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s (PBGC) Pension Insurance Modeling System 
(PIMS), including inputs, outputs, and model assumptions. The review was intended to provide a 
formal evaluation of the technical adequacy of the model by outside experts. Each expert 
participating on the Technical Panel was asked to review background material (see References) 
and focus on a particular aspect of the PIMS model. The list of panelists and topics was 
developed by the Council in discussion with the Social Security Administration (SSA). This 
report and the appended papers herein from our Technical Panel comprise the Final Report under 
this project. 
 
The Panel’s key findings may be summarized as follows: 
 
1. The PIMS models are an important and valuable tool in modeling the Agency’s liability 
risk. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other model that can do a comparable job. 
 
2. Nevertheless, some improvements could be integrated in the Agency’s approach to 
modeling. Those deserving highest priority attention in the experts’ view are the following: 
a) Incorporating systematic mortality risk (i.e., treat mortality and longevity as stochastic 
variables); 
b) Including new asset classes increasingly found in defined benefit plan portfolios (e.g. 
commercial real estate, private equity funds, infrastructure, hedge funds, and others); 
c) Developing a more complex model for the term structure of interest rates; and  
d) Incorporating an option value approach to pricing the insurance provided. 
 
3. The Agency could also do more to communicate the range of uncertainty and potential 
for problems associated with the PBGC’s financial status. This could include additional 
information including the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR), and perhaps an ‘intermediate,’ 
‘optimistic’, and ‘pessimistic’ set of projected outcomes, as well as the expected ‘date of 
exhaustion’ for assets backing pension benefits insured by the PBGC. 
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Technical Review Panel for the PIMS Model: 
Final Report 
 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
 
Introduction 
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federal corporation founded 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. Its goal is to protect 
benefits promised by the private sector defined benefit (DB) pension plans in the United States 
via two insurance programs covering, respectively, single employer and multiemployer plans. To 
carry out its work, the Agency has developed two simulation models over the past two decades, 
the Single Employer Pension Insurance Modeling System (SE-PIMS), and the Multiemployer 
Pension Insurance Modeling System (ME-PIMS). These use several input parameters regarding 
actuarial assumptions, capital market developments, the evolution of assets and liabilities, and 
plan terminations, to model how the Agency’s financial status might unfold over the next decade 
or two. These models require running many simulations to derive a range of possible estimates of 
the PBGC’s future financial status. 
The meeting in April 2013 of the Technical Panel followed up on an earlier Technical 
Panel review in 1996 hosted by the Pension Research Council at the Wharton School. The prior 
discussion offered expert commentary on an early version of the SE-PIMS model then just under 
development. For the 2013 Panel, we invited ten experts to provide their views and judgment 
regarding the soundness and applicability of the current version of the PIMS models, regarding 
economic, finance, statistical, and actuarial principles and reasonableness of key assumptions 
and program inputs. These experts also were asked to offer their assessments on how actuarial 
and statistical calculations are undertaken in the models, model calibrations, and presentation of 
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output. The goal of this meeting, as in 1996, was to offer suggestions on h o w  the PIMS 
systems could be made more useful for analysis and policy.  
 
Background 
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is, according to the 2012 Annual 
Report, a “federal corporation…[that] guarantees payment of basic pension benefits earned by 
nearly 43 million of America’s workers and retirees participating in nearly 26,000 private-sector 
defined benefit pension plans. The Corporation receives no funds from general tax revenues. 
Operations are financed by insurance premiums paid by companies that sponsor defined benefit 
pension plans or from the plans’ assets, investment income, and assets from terminated plans.” 
Its governance structure includes a Director appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate; the Agency is overseen by a Board of Directors chaired by the Secretary of Labor and 
includes the Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury (ex officio). 
The PBGC has two components to its pension insurance program. One covers defined 
benefit pensions offered by employers in the private sector under the Single Employer Plan 
program (SE) involving almost 33 million active and retired workers in about 24,000 pension 
plans. The other covers so-called Taft-Hartley plans under the Multiemployer program (ME) 
which includes about 10 million active and retired employees in some 1,500 pension plans. In 
2013, single employer plans paid to the PBGC in insurance premiums a flat amount of $42 
perworker or retiree and also a variable amount of $9 per $1000 of unfunded vested benefits. 1 
Multiemployer plans paid a flat premium of $12 per worker or retiree. Retiree benefits are 
guaranteed by the PBGC up to a cap: in 2013, covered employees claiming benefits at age 
1 All 2013 data are taken from http://www.pbgc.gov/res/factsheets/page/pbgc-
facts.html 
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65 could receive a maximum of $4,789.77/month ($57,477.24/year) for the single employer 
plan, payable as a single life annuity. In the multi-employer arena, the annual benefit guaranteed 
can be up to $12,870.2 In the multi-employer arena, the annual guaranteed benefit is up to 
$12,870. The guaranteed amount is reduced actuarially for earlier claimants (or for those having 
survivor benefits). The guarantee is increased for those who claim post-age 65. 
For a variety of reasons, the PBGC’s finances are not in long-term balance.3 The 
Agency’s 2012 Annual Report noted that the SE program had liabilities of $112.1 billion and 
assets of $83.0 billion, for a deficit of $29.1 billion. For the ME program, the Agency reported 
liabilities of $7 billion and assets of $1.8 billion, producing a deficit of $5.2 billion. The Agency 
also projects future income and payout streams for 10 or 20 years into the future, though it 
acknowledges substantial uncertainty regarding these projections. Estimates of the SE program’s 
financial position in FY 2022 range from a $66 billion deficit at the 15th percentile to a $1 billion 
surplus at the 85th percentile, with a mean estimate of a  $32 billion deficit, all values expressed 
in present value terms. Estimates of the ME program’s financial position in FY2022 range 
from a $43 billion deficit at the 15th percentile to a $9 billion deficit at the 85th percentile, with a 
mean estimate of a  $26 billion deficit, all values expressed in present value terms. These 
“long-term” estimates include “probable terminations” from plans that it is likely to have to take 
over in the future, but the Agency does not book as losses those plans it deems to be “reasonably 
possible terminations”; both “probable terminations” and “reasonably possible terminations” are 
determined in accordance with the FASB Accounting Standards Codification Section 450, 
Contingencies. 
 
2 Multiemployer information is available at http://www.pbgc.gov/res/factsheets/page/pbgc-
facts.html. 
3 All data in this paragraph are taken from the PBGC 2012 Exposure Report 
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Key Findings from the Technical Panel Review 
 The Technical Panel offered several comments and suggestions regarding the way the 
PIMS models assets, liabilities, and the interactions between the two. Moreover the Panel 
provided suggestions on how the PBGC might enhance the way it reports its status to 
policymakers and the public, so as to better communicate the risks and opportunities the Agency 
faces. We briefly discuss each in turn, and we refer interested readers to the individual 
expert papers produced under the Panel’s auspices, for further detail (see References).  
 
Modeling Defined Benefit Pension and PBGC Liabilities 
PBGC liabilities consist of the vested accrued benefits payable under Title IV of ERISA 
(i.e., guaranteed and, in some circumstances, non-guaranteed benefits provided under the law) 
of already-terminated pension plans, as well as the Title IV benefits of insured underfunded 
plans that are likely to terminate in the future. Several of the experts on the Technical Panel had 
comments and suggestions regarding how the PIMS models treat such liabilities. 
The cash flows owed by the PBGC consist of pension benefits promised to active, 
terminated vested, and retired workers under each plan’s benefit rules. In terminated SE plans, 
these are relatively straightforward to model as they are fixed as of the date of the plan’s 
termination. As Novy-Marx (2013) and others note, at plan termination, the PBGC takes over 
the plan’s accrued benefit obligation (ABO), with benefits computed given known formulas and 
frozen wage, tenure, and age distributions as of the termination date. 
Nonetheless, even here, important unknowns remain, such as when participants will retire 
and how long participants (and their survivors) will live in the future. Thus demographers and 
economists have modeled systematic mortality shocks that could pose substantial risk to PBGC 
solvency in the future. Maurer (2013) notes that this form of uncertainty can now be modeled 
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and, accordingly, may be integrated into the PIMs model to determine the future path of the 
Agency’s payouts. The Agency could also cost out how expensive it would be to hedge 
stochastic mortality risk. And the PIMS model currently includes only single male mortality 
tables; these could be extended allowing for both female and survivor tables.4 
Greater uncertainty pertains to the possible time path of benefits associated with future 
terminations, inherently a more complex process and one which, in the experts’ views, may 
understate the size of the problem faced. One reason is that PIMS assumes that plans will 
only be terminated in distress, and hence it assumes no voluntary (i.e., standard) termination of 
fully funded pensions. But as several of the experts note, this is increasingly not the case. Fuerst 
and Bone point out that many single employer DB plans have recently de-risked by outsourcing 
their pensions to insurers. This reduces the future premiums payable to the PBGC, and it also 
diminishes the asset pool available to the Agency in the event of future terminations.5 Segal 
notes that allowing for newer plans of the hybrid and cash balance variety could also imply the 
need for different ways to model future liabilities. 
In the case of ME plans, benefit payouts can be reduced under certain circumstances; it is 
unclear whether this flexibility in benefit payments will be extended to SE plans in the 
future. Yet as Bone points out, the ME program appears to be in a worse condition than the SE 
program, as ME plans come to the Agency for financial assistance when they have no assets to 
pay the promised benefits. For this and other reason (e.g., the extremely low premium), costs 
associated with the ME plans may pose more risk to the PBGC than does SE plan underfunding. 
4 The Agency has noted in comments to the Panel’s report that, although there is no direct 
adjustment for female mortality, the initial PIMS liabilities are recalibrated to each plans’ 
reported liabilities which indirectly adjusts them to reflect the plan’s female mortality. 
5 The Agency has noted in comments to the Panel’s report that concern about the diminution of 
the asset pool in the event of future terminations is unwarranted in the context of standard 
terminations, since these are fully funded. 
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Much of the Panel discussion focused on how to bring an options-based approach into 
PIMS models. The goal of doing so would be to link the factors that drive plan sponsor 
terminations and plan underfunding to stock market risk.6 The options approach differs from a 
Net Present Value (NPV) method, by taking into account the possibility that company 
management will react to market changes dynamically and strategically. That is, this approach 
models alternative scenarios to identify the best corporate action given different outcomes. Since 
companies are modeled as reacting sensibly to uncertain financial outcomes, the plan sponsors 
can take advantage of uncertainty to reduce volatility in profitability compared to a conventional 
NPV metric. The risk-neutral valuation methodology takes into account the probability 
distribution of risk and typically discounts outcomes using a risk-free rate.  
Lucas notes that such an approach could be usefully built on top of the plan-specific 
computations that the PIMS models already incorporate. The Congressional Budget Office in 
2005 developed a somewhat simplified method of modeling the PBGC’s problem which 
demonstrated proof of concept. This work focused on the joint probabilities of sponsor 
bankruptcy and DB plan underfunding, and it generated much larger estimates of funding 
shortfalls; these resulted from projected smaller asset recoveries, less premium income, and 
higher liabilities than the actuarial approach.7 That effort suggested that taking into account risk 
in this way would roughly double premium costs. One important reason for this is that the 
distribution of liabilities is likely to be characterized by so-called “fat tails,” referring to the 
potential for large losses in the worst-case scenarios, as Segal, Bone, and Novy-Marx point out. 
6 The Agency has noted that, in the current PIMS model, both plan sponsors’ bankruptcy risks 
and plan funding are linked to stock market risk and both links can be shown to have significant 
effects in PIMS projections. Nevertheless, the Agency has not published extended model output 
demonstrating the sensitivities of those links. 
7 PBGC has done similar analysis using the current model framework but this has been used 
internally and is not publicly available. 
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A related theme that the Panel debated was how to summarize the system’s liabilities at 
any point in time and over future time periods. Current practice is to report expected present 
discounted values (PVs) using Treasury rates to do the discounting. But as Lucas notes, this 
approach has a fundamental but potentially fixable shortcoming: it cannot be used to answer 
questions about market valuation of future streams of cash flows. Moreover, as Novy-Marx 
points out, which liability concept to use depends on the observer’s vantage point. From the 
perspective of the covered insured active and retired pension plan participants, the guarantee 
embodies some risk: the system’s assets are insufficient to meet all future benefits that might be 
paid, and the PBGC’s guarantee is not backed by the full faith and credit of the Federal 
government. Absent a large transfer from Congress to cover its future cash flows, it is unlikely 
that all benefits can be paid in the long run.8 From an insurer’s perspective, the right way to 
measure possible liabilities is to measure the risk-neutral valuation of the insurance. An 
approach favored by some would be to have the PBGC provide the distribution of projected 
future cash flow paths it guarantees 
 
Modeling Assets 
Next we summarize the Panel’s key suggestions regarding how the PBGC models assets 
in the PIMS. Geczy notes that the current approach estimates risk and return patterns drawing on 
historical data, assuming a fixed real interest rate and holding constant historical correlations. 
But having experienced the recent global financial crisis, we now know that tail risk is far more 
of a concern than previously anticipated. Accordingly, most of the experts felt that the PIMS 
model would benefit from stress testing in terms of its sensitivity to extreme events and time-
8 The PBGC’s projections suggest that the SE program will be able to cover promised benefits 
for the next decade given its assumptions, whereas the ME program is likely to run short. 
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varying returns, relaxing the ‘random walk’ approach to modeling risk. 
A related point emphasized by Maurer was that the PIMS model currently relies heavily 
on a relatively simple model for a single interest rate – the 30 year Treasury rate. This is 
important since the interest rate model is used as an input for actuarial valuation of liabilities of 
terminated and ongoing plans; to determine minimum contribution rates; to specify the return on 
PBGC assets for terminated plans; to set the yield for corporate bonds; to set the inflation rate; to 
set the nominal benefit growth (since inflation is related to the nominal interest rate); and to 
calculate the present value of PBGC claims. Yet modern tools now exist for more complete and 
comprehensive models of the complete term structure of interest rates, and several experts felt 
this could be a fertile area for model development. 
Additionally, several Panel members highlighted the fact that the DB plan asset mix is 
currently assumed in the PIMS model to be a 60/40 US stock/bond split. But as Geczy, Maurer, 
and Fabozzi emphasize, today’s pension plans hold more alternatives and are more 
internationally diversified. These alternative assets are quite varied, and they include commercial 
real estate, private equity funds, infrastructure investments, hedge funds, and other holdings. 
Evidently, including additional relatively illiquid assets in the PIMS model would be complex. 
As Fabozzi notes, there is a tradeoff between the speed at which the model can be run, versus 
more complex assumptions about the assets held and the pattern of capital market returns. 
 
Considerations Regarding the Modeling of PBGC Insurance Protection 
Several presentations by Technical Panel members suggest that the PIMS model could be 
adapted to better integrate how risks affect both pension assets and liabilities jointly. 
Additionally most felt that these could be fruitfully co-managed using an Asset/Liability 
Management framework. In the past, PBGC assets have, during some periods,  been invested 
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independently from the Agency’s liabilities, with investment policy changing b a c k  a n d  
f o r t h  over time between maximizing expected returns and a liability- driven approach. 
Some Panel members argue that it would be important to model particular industries and sectors 
posing most risk to the Agency, in which case the PIMS model could be used to align the 
Agency’s investment policy with this broader attention to risks. 
It is also worth emphasizing that, unlike a private-sector insurer, the PBGC’s insurance 
premiums are set by Congress; that is, the PBGC has no statutory ability to set its own premiums 
or to deny coverage to extremely risky plans. As Babbel and several other Panel members note, 
this is problematic since the Agency faces large legacy costs and is unlikely to be able to close 
its funding gap with feasible premium increases. Additionally, the recently enacted legislation 
entitled Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) again deferred 
contribution hikes, thus exacerbating the problem. In the UK, by contrast, the Pension Protection 
Fund (PPF) has substantially more flexibility in setting premiums and specific objectives. Thus 
Clark reports that the PPF uses a stochastic approach to evaluate the risks and set risk-based 
premiums in a manner consistent with the Board’s risk tolerance. As a consequence, the 
PPF’s model is more cognizant of a variety of risks not currently embedded in the PBGC 
model, and the PPF prices for self-sufficiency in 2030. 
A related issue is that the PIMS program does not incorporate potential moral hazard 
issues that could result from insured plans reacting to changes in PBGC or Congressional 
policy. The ME PIMS model does take into account the chance that mass withdrawals could 
result from a given plan, or that a plan could be rendered insolvent prior to a mass 
withdrawal. But the model does not permit the examination of how individual plan sponsors 
might respond, and a longer-term project would include the integration of such feedbacks. 
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Communication of Risk and Uncertainty 
The Technical Panel also devoted attention to how PBGC risk is communicated. This is 
important since key stakeholders, including Congress, plan participants, plan sponsors, and 
taxpayers, need to more clearly comprehend what might happen in bad states of the world – 
which have become more salient than previously. 
One way to explain pension system risk more intuitively is proposed by Maurer who 
points to the usefulness of a Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR), also known as the expected 
shortfall or “expected tail loss.” This is widely used as a loss measure depicting the worst-case 
loss scenarios at a particular level of risk. This author recommends it as a possibly better risk 
measure that could be used when explaining the possible losses that might result from a PBGC 
shortfall.  
Another issue under discussion is the time period over which system assets and liabilities 
are reported. Currently the PBGC reports mean values, along with the ‘high’ and ‘low’ 15 
percentiles of the 5,000 SE simulations and 500 ME simulations carried out, for 10 years into the 
future. Of course, as projections are made further into the future, the extent of uncertainty grows. 
Yet focusing on only a decade ahead implicitly downweights the liabilities that the Agency may 
have to pay in years thereafter. As a matter of fact, open plans today continue to accrue benefit 
promises that will need to be paid many more decades into the future.  
It is worth noting that several other government entities that pay benefit promises long 
into the future, such as the Social Security Administration, are required to offer projections 75 
years into the future, as well as “in perpetuity.” Additional sensitivity to longer payout periods in 
the PBGC context would offer additional perspective on future solvency considerations.9 Some 
9 Some argue that long-term projections may make more sense for a program like Social Security 
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Panel members also favor highlighting the “date of exhaustion” of the PBGC’s assets backing 
benefit promises, since this is a concept that is relatively easy to explain. Nevertheless, such 
information also has a history of being used to deflect attention from PBGC problems. For 
instance, some might ask why premiums should be raised today on plan sponsors, if the Agency 
has sufficient assets to pay more than 10 years of benefits.  
The PBGC has also seen non-intuitive results in projections of the asset exhaustion date 
(at least in the SE program); for instance, the size of the deficit and the date of asset exhaustion 
often move in opposite directions. One reason is that large claims increasing the deficit may 
extend the date of asset exhaustion due to the inflow of plan assets when PBGC takes over a 
plan. And ultimately if Congress were to decide to bail out the PBGC in the event of insolvency, 
it is unclear which would be worse: a bailout that came sooner, or one that was later and 
probably more costly? In this case, one could reasonably question whether asset exhaustion dates 
belong on a short list of highlighted information points always provided by PBGC projections. 
 
Conclusions 
ERISA marks its 40th anniversary in 2014. Despite the fact that this law was designed to 
ensure that participants in private sector defined benefit plans would have a secure retirement, 
concerns continue to mark debate over the future of US defined benefit plans. Few new DB plans 
are being created; many existing DB plans are frozen; some large plans continue to hover on the 
which is projecting more predictable flows. The PBGC is subject to most of the same long-run 
uncertainties as Social Security, but this Agency has additional uncertainties that are more 
sensitive to difficult to predict events, including sponsor bankruptcies, voluntary components of 
funding decisions, voluntary decisions over sponsorship of PBGC insured plans, pension-related 
legislative changes (major changes have occurred in every recent decade), and market returns of 
different risky asset classes. Some panel members agreed with the limited value of longer-run 
projections of corporate bankruptcies, for instance. 
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brink of termination; and the recent wave of de-risking suggests that fewer premiums will be 
flowing into the PBGC than anticipated. Moreover, many of the suggestions and 
recommendations outlined in the Technical Panel’s comments would imply that a large transfer 
will be required, or insurance premiums raised substantially, and/or benefits curtailed, if the 
system is to be able to continue to provide some benefits to all of those who were promised 
retiree payouts. 
The Technical Panel concurred that the PIMS models are an important and valuable tool 
in modeling the Agency’s liability risk. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other model 
that can do a comparable job. Nevertheless, some improvements could be integrated in the 
Agency’s approach. Among those deserving attention in the Technical Panel’s view are the 
following: 
• Incorporating systematic mortality risk; 
• Including new asset classes increasingly found in defined benefit plan portfolios; 
• Developing an updated model for the term structure of interest rates; and 
• Incorporating an option value approach to pricing the insurance provided. 
The Agency could also do more to communicate the range of uncertainty and potential for 
problems associated with the PBGC’s financial status. This could include additional information 
including the Conditional Value-ay-Risk (CVaR), and perhaps an “intermediate,” “optimistic,” 
and a “pessimistic” set of projected outcomes, as well as the expected “date of exhaustion” for 
assets backing pension benefits insured by the PBGC. 
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Appendix: Meeting Agenda 
 
Technical Review Panel for the PIMS Model 
Hosted by the Pension Research Council, & Michigan Retirement Research Center 
April 24, 2013, The Wharton School 
 
Moderator and Organizer: 
Olivia S. Mitchell, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania 
 
I. Understanding Defined Benefit Plan Asset and Liability Risk 
Chris Geczy, The Wharton School: “Financial Market Assumptions & Models for Pension Plans: 
A Technical Comment on the PIMS Model Assumptions for Asset Markets” 
 
Robert Novy-Marx, University of Rochester: “Economic and Financial Approaches to Pension 
Liabilities” 
 
Raimond Maurer, Goethe University, Frankfurt: “Integrated Risk Management for Defined Benefit 
Pensions: Models and Metrics” 
 
II. Actuarial Perspectives on Defined Benefit Pension Plan Risk 
Don Fuerst, American Academy of Actuaries: “Actuarial Assumptions & Models for DB 
Pensions” 
 
Chris Bone, Edth Ltd.: “Actuarial Perspectives on Defined Benefit Pension Risk – Modeling 
Emerging Issues” 
 
Don Segal, former President, Society of Actuaries: “An Actuarial Perspective on Pension System 
Risk” 
 
Keynote 
Martin Clarke, Pension Protection Fund (UK): “Modeling Risk-based Pension Insurance 
Premiums in the UK” 
 
III. Understanding Pension System Risk 
Frank Fabozzi, EDHEC: “Measuring and Explaining Pension System Risk” 
 
Debbie Lucas, MIT: Joint Risk of DB Pension Underfunding and Sponsor Termination: 
Incorporating Options-Based Projections and Valuations into PIMS. 
 
IV. Pension Insurance: Risk Pricing Perspectives 
David Babbel, Wharton (Emeritus): “Evaluating Pension Insurance Pricing” 
 
